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INTRODUCTION 
“The challenge, and it is a formidable one, is to nurture scientific exploration, encourage, 
the translation of these new discoveries into life saving medicines, and put into place public 
policies reflective of our core American values that prevent the unjust, unfair, and discriminatory 
use of genetic information.”1  In the area of genetic technologies, medicine and science have far 
surpassed the law.  What can now be learned about a person’s genetic make-up is far beyond 
anything that was ever imagined.2  Genetic testing can provide presymptomatic information 
                                                 
1 Hearings on the National Genome Research Institute, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Francis S. Collins, 
Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute).    
2 See Kourtney L. Pickens, Don’t Judge Me by My Genes: A Survey of Federal Genetic Discrimination Legislation, 
34 TULSA L.J. 161 (1998). 
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about an individual’s predisposition to future disease, disability, or early death.3  The problem is 
that people are refusing to take these potentially lifesaving genetic tests out of fear of being 
discriminated against, particularly in employment and health care.  Currently, there is no 
adequate federal legislation to protect individuals from this genetic discrimination.   
Every individual has genetic predispositions to a variety of conditions.4  No individual 
should have to choose between the benefits of a genetic test and keeping a job or health 
insurance.  Individuals should not be hesitant to undergo potentially lifesaving genetic tests or to 
participate in genetic research based on the fear that they will be discriminated against by 
employers and health insurers.  Public perceptions and fears of genetic discrimination indicate 
that current legislation provides inadequate protection, and that more comprehensive federal 
legislation is warranted.  It is time for Congress to act on this complex and extremely important 
issue of genetic discrimination by employers and health insurers.  Comprehensive legislation 
needs to be passed that addresses and alleviates public fear of genetic discrimination.  
Legislation that addresses and alleviates public fear will enable more individuals to seek genetic 
testing and treatment, thus contributing to research, public health, and the general welfare of 
society.  With genetic discrimination as a growing concern, President George W. Bush, in a June 
23, 2001 radio address urged Congress to work with the administration to pass a law that is “fair, 
reasonable, and consistent with existing discrimination statutes.”5   
                                                 
3 See Paul S. Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes?  Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 225, 226 (2000). 
4 See Protecting Against Genetic Discrimination: The Limits of Existing Laws: Hearing Before the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Debra L. Ness, National 
Partnership for Women & Families).  Scientists estimate each person has somewhere between five and fifty 
predispositions to certain conditions, and that by knowing our genetic makeup will allow us to reduce our risks 
through preventive medicine or lifestyle changes.  See id.    
5 OLPA, Genetic Discrimination, (visited April 6, 2002) 
<http://www.olpa.od.nih.gov/Legislation.December%202001/geneticdiscrim.htm>. 
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This Article will give a brief explanation of genetics and the potential for genetic 
discrimination in employment and health insurance.  Federal and state legislation will be 
addressed, as well as pending legislation potentially affecting genetic discrimination.  The 
legislation will be analyzed to come to the conclusion that current legislation provides 
inadequate protection against genetic discrimination in the areas of employment and health 
insurance.  Arguments will be presented in support of protection from employment and health 
insurance discrimination based on genetic information.  Finally, a proposal will be made for 
federal legislation that protects individuals from denial or loss of employment or health 
insurance based on genetic information.    
I. BACKGROUND 
Genes contain the set of instructions for making proteins within cells.6  These proteins 
constitute the building blocks of cells, and ultimately, of entire organisms, including complex 
organisms such as human beings.7  Genes represent the blueprint for each individual’s biological 
make-up.8  Each gene is a large molecule of deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA.9  Inheritance of 
individual traits such as certain diseases or disorders and predisposition to diseases or disorders 
are passed from generation to generation by one’s genes.10  Genetic mutations can potentially 
alter the protein and result in a disease or disorder.11  These genetic mutations can be inherited 
from a parent, can develop from an error during cell division, or can merely be acquired from the 
                                                 
6 See Jeremy A. Colby, An Analysis of Genetic Discrimination Legislation Proposed by the 105th Congress, 24 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 443, 446-47 (1998). 
7 See Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination Dilemma in Light of the Human 
Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J. 503, 519 (1997). 
8 See id. 
9 See Miller, supra note 3, at 228. 
10 See id. at 227-28. 
11 See id. at 229. 
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environment.12  Therefore, by identifying certain genetic information, one can determine a 
person’s probability of manifesting certain traits, including diseases and other disorders.13   
 Genetic testing involves examining a person’s DNA for something that flags a disease or 
disorder.14  Through this process “[s]uspected mutations and predisposition to disease can be 
confirmed by genetic testing before symptoms appear.”15  There are three different types of 
genetic tests: (1) carrier; (2) prenatal or postnatal; and (3) adult presymptomatic.16  Genetic 
testing can identify carriers of certain diseases and disorders.17  Carriers do not have the disease 
or disorder and may never develop it, but possess the recessive genes and pass them to their 
children.18  Adult presymptomatic testing is conducted to analyze an individual’s susceptibility 
to disease or disorder before the individual shows any symptoms.19  The predictive ability of 
genetic testing is somewhat limited because a genetic test will only reveal a possibility that the 
individual may develop the trait, disease, or disorder sometime in the future and are not absolute 
indicators that symptoms will develop.20   
It was not until recently that scientists and medical experts conducted adult 
presymptomatic genetic testing on single genes that predispose a person to a genetic disease.21  
                                                 
12 See id. 
13 See id. at 228. 
14 See Denise K. Casey, What Can the New Gene Tests Tell Us?, 36 JUDGES’ J. 14, 16 (1997). 
15 Miller, supra note 3, at 229. 
16 See Nathalie Smith, Note,  The Right to Genetic Privacy?  Are we Unlocking the Secrets of the Human Genome 
Only to Risk Insurance and Employment Discrimination,  2000 UTAH L. REV. 705,  709 (2000). 
17 See Miller, supra note 3, at 229. 
18 See NATIONAL CANCER INST., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., UNDERSTANDING GENE TESTING 5, 9 
(1995). 
19 See Smith supra note 16, at 709. 
20 See Colby, supra note 6, at 449.  The probability that one of these genetic mutations will manifest into a particular 
disease or disorder is based on a variety of factors such as environment.  See National Cancer Inst., supra  note 18, 
at 7.   A genetic mutation for Huntington’s disease will develop with an almost certainty.  See Casey, supra  note 14, 
at 18.  The likelihood of the breast cancer BRCA1 mutation manifesting is around eighty percent, but only if there is 
a family history of breast cancer.  See National Cancer Inst., supra note 18, at 14.  Without a history the individual’s 
risk remains uncertain.  See id. at 19.  Mutations for diseases such as cystic fibrosis and Alzheimers Disease have an 
uncertain predictive ability.  See Miller, supra note 3, at 231.   
21 See Smith, supra note 16, at 709. 
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Faster ways of discovering new genes through genomics has significantly increased the number 
of genes that can be tested for certain diseases and disorders.22  Currently, there are over five 
hundred genetic tests available and this number is increasing rapidly.23  The increase in genetic 
research and technology has been directly related to the Human Genome Project (HGP).24   
The HGP is an international research effort designed to locate and map out all human 
genes, collectively known as the human genome.25  Information that is gained from these 
biological studies will be made available to scientists, physicians, and others in order that the 
results may be rapidly used for the improvement of human health and the public good.26  In 
February of 2001 the HGP scientists published the working draft DNA of the human genome, 
“the three billion-letter genetic instruction book for a human being.”27  With the human genome 
sequence in hand scientists are working to develop new diagnostic tests and therapeutics.28  This 
genetic information can potentially lead to early detection, intervention, and prevention of many 
common diseases.29   
From the beginning of the HGP, “it was clearly recognized that acquisition and use of 
such genetic knowledge would have momentous implications for both individuals and society 
                                                 
22 See id. 
23 See Protecting Against Genetic Discrimination: The Limits of Existing Laws: Hearing Before the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Bobby P. Jindal, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services). 
24 See Miller, supra note 3, at 226. 
25 See Hearings on the National Genome Research Institute, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Francis S. Collins, 
Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute).   The HGP is jointly managed by the U.S. Department 
of Energy and the National Institutes of Health, with the goal of analyzing and sequencing the estimated 50,000-
100,000 human genes.  See National Human Genome Research Inst., The Human Genome Project (visited Nov. 6, 
2001) <http://www.nhgri.gov/HGP/>. 
26 See id. 
27 Protecting Against Genetic Discrimination: The Limits of Existing Laws: Hearing Before the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Bobby P. Jindal, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services). 
28 See id.   
29 See id. 
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and would pose a number of policy choices for public and professional deliberation.”30  
Therefore, “[a]nalysis of the ethical, legal, and social implications of the genetic knowledge, and 
the development of policy options for public consideration” is another major component of the 
HGP, which has devoted a portion of its funding to ethical, legal, and social implications 
(ELSI).31  While these HGP developments will aid society in countless ways, even with ELSI 
there remains the fear of genetic discrimination. 
A.  Description of the Problem 
 The benefits of these advances in genetic technologies are clear because as genetic causes 
of disease are found, effective treatments and cures may be developed.32  Furthermore, an 
individual with a genetic predisposition towards a disease will have an opportunity to plan for 
the future, and a chance to prevent adverse effects or onset of the disease.33  However, with the 
benefits of genetic testing also comes risks to the individual, “many of which are evident given 
America’s history of genetic discrimination.”34  In the broadest sense, genetic discrimination 
occurs when genetic information is used to treat people differently.35   
Genetic testing inevitably causes conflicts between an employers and insurers right to 
access information and the individuals right to privacy.36  For employers, access to genetic 
information reduces employment costs relating to potential time-off for illness or replacement, as 
well as reduce costs for those employers who either self-insure or provide for group health 
                                                 
30 National Human Genome Research Inst., supra note 25. 
31 Id. 
32 See Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Mapping the Human Genome, 65 CAL. L. REV. 579, 580 (1991). 
33 See Deborah Gridley, Note, Genetic Testing Under the ADA: A Case for Protection From Employment 
Discrimination, 89 GEO. L.J. 973, 977 (2001). 
34 Id. 
35 See Genetic Information in the Workplace: Hearing Before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions, 106th Cong. (July 20, 2000) (testimony of Susannah Baruch, National Partnership for Women & 
Families). 
36 See Smith, supra note 16, at 711. 
 6 
insurance.37  Similarly, for health insurers, access to genetic information provides a more cost 
effective means of implementing its industry-wide practice of classifying individuals based on 
their future risks.38  “Access to, and the use of, genetic information, the potential threats posed by 
insurers or employers mandating genetic testing, and whether policy makers should treat genetic 
information separately from an individuals medical records, are continuous topics in today’s 
state and federal legislatures.”39  The reason is that there are policy concerns, including 
autonomy, privacy, and justice because a person’s genetic information can be considered highly 
personal information about an individual’s current and future health.40  Privacy is of the utmost 
importance because DNA contains information that the individual may not want to know, but 
others such as employers and insurers wish to discover.41 
One major problem with giving employers and health insurers access to genetic 
information is the misperception that “genetic tests can predict completely and accurately 
whether a person will develop a genetic disease.”42  The concern is that employers and health 
insurers may misinterpret and misuse genetic information to exclude an individual based on the 
misconception that having a genetic trait is the same as having the actual disease or disorder.43  
Discriminating against people based on their genes is unfair, considering that it cannot be 
accurately predicted that an individual will actually develop the disease or disorder. 
                                                 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 Id. 
40 See Burk Burnett, Note, Genetic Discrimination: Legislation Required to Keep Genetic Secrets, 21 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 502, 533 (1997). 
41 See Tara L. Rachinsky, Comment, Genetic Testing: Toward a Comprehensive Policy to Prevent Genetic 
Discrimination in the Workplace, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 575, 584 (2000). 
42 Miller, supra note 3, at 232. 
43 See id. 
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A second major problem is that people fearing discrimination from employer and health 
insurers will refuse to take genetic tests.44  This is alarming considering that in some situations 
genetic testing may be a potentially lifesaving measure.45  The fact that the people who seriously 
need genetic testing are avoiding it, to avoid discrimination seems to suggest that current 
legislation provides inadequate protection to these individuals.  
Another major problem is that the potential for genetic discrimination may have an 
adverse effect on research.  Scientists fear that this problem of individuals avoiding genetic tests 
will halt research.  The concern is that misuse of genetic information by employers and health 
insurers will cause serious problems, and impede the ability of scientists to continue important 
genetic research.46  Therefore, the advancement of genetic research is another reason laws should 
provide protection from discrimination based on genetic information.   
B.  Employment Discrimination 
Currently, estimates show that genetic testing by employers is relatively uncommon.47  
American Management Association reports show that in 2000 approximately three percent of 
employers conducted genetic screenings on employees.48  Although this count is low, the 
numbers will most likely increase as genetic technology of human genetics improves and genetic 
testing becomes more cost efficient.49  It is anticipated that an employer’s economic incentives 
for genetic testing will increase as the number disease causing genes or genes that indicate a 
                                                 
44 See Colby, supra note 6, at 452.   
45 See id. 
46 See Genetic Information in the Workplace: Hearing Before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions, 106th Cong. (July 20, 2000) (statement of Francis S. Collins, Director of the National Human Genome 
Research Institute), 2000 WL 1115522, at *3. 
47 See Smith, supra note 16, at 716. 
48 See Protecting Against Genetic Discrimination: The Limits of Existing Laws: Hearing Before the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Ronald L. Adler, Laurdan 
Associates, Inc.) (only 7 of the 2,133 companies responding to the survey admitted performing genetic tests).   
49 See National Conference of State Legislatures, Mapping Public Policy for Genetic Technologies: A Legislator’s 
Resource Guide 8-3 (Brenda A Trolin ed., 1998). 
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predisposition to disease or disorder grows, and as health care cost continue to increase.50  
Employers will likely attempt to gain this information by conducting genetic testing, gaining 
access to employee’s medical records, or “simply by learning about the individual’s family 
history.”51 
Various reasons exist as to why an employer would want to use genetic information to 
screen employees.  There is a growing public concern over the use of genetic information for 
discriminatory purposes by employers to “lower their insurance and sick leave costs by screening 
out individuals who have traits linked to inherited medical conditions.”52  This is an increasing 
concern as more employers self-insure their employees rather than use group health insurance 
policies.53  Many genetic diseases and predispositions to diseases are serious and require costly 
and comprehensive medical care.54  This is an incentive for employers to refrain from hiring, 
promoting, or firing individuals who are predisposed to genetic diseases or disorders.55 
According to a Georgetown University study, fears of workplace discrimination have 
prevented one out of ten respondents from “getting tested for genetic traits linked to breast 
cancer, cystic fibrosis, Huntington’s Disease, colon cancer, or other conditions, even though 
early detection and treatment could possibly improve their lives.”56  These fears are not 
baseless.57  Thirteen percent of the respondents to the Georgetown University survey reported 
that they or a family member had been denied a job or terminated from a job because of a genetic 
                                                 
50 See id. 
51 Id. 
52 Miller, supra  note 3, at 232. 
53 See Smith, supra  note 16, at 717.  It is estimated that fifty-eight percent of employers self-insure employees.  See 
id. 
54 See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 49, at 8-2.   
55 See id. 
56 Miller, supra  note 3, at 234. 
57 See id. 
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condition in the family.58  In a well-publicized case settled by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad required any 
employee who suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome to undergo genetic testing, and employees 
who refused to be tested were threatened with discipline or even the loss of their jobs.59   In 
another case, not as well known, a woman in her early thirties found out through a genetic test 
that she had the BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 genetic predisposition to breast cancer, and decided to 
undergo preventive surgery.60  Everyone in her small office knew about this test and her decision 
to undergo preventive surgery.61  A few weeks later the woman was fired, despite excellent 
reviews and recent promises of promotions and raises.62   Genetic discrimination does exist in the 
workplace, and it is likely that employers will increasingly use genetic information in the future 
for hiring and for continued employment.  This likely impact on an individual’s privacy and 
employment possibilities needs to be addressed by the legislature.  
C.  Health Insurance Discrimination 
As genetic technologies advance, and as the ability to anticipate disease or disorder 
becomes more refined, the question of who should pay and how much will pose a great dilemma 
for insurance companies and policy makers.63  Individually purchased health insurance is based 
on medical underwriting, which takes into account an individual’s health when an application for 
                                                 
58 See id. at 237. 
59 See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
60 See Protecting Against Genetic Discrimination: The Limits of Existing Laws: Hearing Before the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Debra L. Ness, National 
Partnership for Women & Families).   The woman in early thirties decided to get tested because of an extensive 
family history of early deaths from breast cancer.  See id.   The extensive family history combined with the BRCA 1 
and BRCA 2 genetic predisposition indicate a very high risk of developing breast cancer.  See id.  The woman 
decided to undergo a prophylactic mastectomy as a form of preventive treatment.  See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See Chetan Gulati, Genetic Antidiscrimination in Health Insurance: A Misguided Solution, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH 
L.J. 149, 162 (2001). 
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insurance is reviewed.64  Therefore, advancements in genetic technology and predicting an 
individual’s future health will affect health insurance, and potentially lead to discrimination.65   
The group of individuals at risk for genetic discrimination are people who are carriers of 
a genetic predisposition and relatives of people with a disease or disorder that has been linked 
with a gene.66  Once a disease or disorder has been linked with a gene an insurance company will 
look for a family history, for an unknown preexisting condition.67  These actions by health 
insurance companies have negative implications for otherwise healthy individuals.  In a recent 
survey of individuals with a known genetic condition in the family, twenty percent indicated that 
they had been refused health insurance coverage because of their genetic information, regardless 
of whether they were sick or not.68  Further studies have documented cases of genetic 
discrimination against individuals who are healthy themselves, but who have a gene that 
predisposes them or their children to a later illness such as Huntington’s disease.69   
The threat of genetic discrimination is real, and “millions of Americans risk losing health 
coverage because they carry genes making them vulnerable to disease.”70  Health insurance 
companies have used results of genetic tests “to justify canceling coverage, saying that a genetic 
abnormality is a preexisting condition; to deny coverage to unaffected relatives of a person with 
                                                 
64 See Richard A. Bornstein, Note, Genetic Discrimination, Insurability and Legislation: A Closing of the Legal 
Loopholes, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 551, 563-64 (1996).  Medical underwriting is used to evaluate different risk factors, and 
the higher the risk, the higher the premium; the lower the risk, the lower the premium.  See Robert J. Pokorski, 
Principles of Insurance and Risk Classification, in THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN RISK 
CLASSIFICATION 45 (Genetic Testing Committee to the Medical Section of the Medical Section of the American 
Council of Life Insurance ed., 1989). 
65 See Bornstein, supra note 64, at 564-65. 
66 See id. at 568. 
67 See id. 
68 See H.R. 602, The Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act, (visited Feb. 8, 2002) 
<http://www.house.gov/slaughter/leg-record/leg602.htm>. 
69 See id. 
70 Medical Ethics: Experts Recommend Genetic Privacy Laws: AM. HEALTH LINE, Oct. 23, 1995, at 12 (citing top 
U.S. health officials who appealed to insurance companies to end discriminatory insurance practices).     
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a genetic disorder; and to refuse to issue a policy unless an applicant submits to a genetic test.”71  
It is clear that health insurance companies will deny insurance based on genetic information even 
though an individual may never have the disease or disorder, or even have the genetic 
predisposition to the disease or disorder. Health insurance is a necessity, and excessive premiums 
or denial of health insurance should not burden individuals who might have an increased risk of 
suffering from a particular disease.72  Information such as this favors the idea that state and 
federal legislation protecting privacy and prohibiting genetic discrimination is necessary, and is 
currently inadequate.   
II. OVERVIEW & ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION PROTECTING AGAINST GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 
 Congress and state legislatures have proposed and enacted some legislation to prevent 
potential abuses of genetic information.  However, genetic discrimination legislation enacted so 
far leaves several legislative loopholes permitting genetic discrimination.73  Currently, no federal 
statute explicitly addresses genetic discrimination in the workplace or by health insurance 
companies.74  Many states have implemented a variety of nondiscrimination laws, but the 
approaches are incomplete, vary significantly and are often too narrowly worded.75  
A.  Current Federal Law: Employment Discrimination 
 No current federal statute explicitly addresses genetic discrimination in the workplace.76  
However, there are existing federal laws in place that prohibit disability discrimination in 
employment, which may provide some protection against genetic discrimination.77 
 
                                                 
71 See Susan Ince, Predictive Testing; A Bite of the Apple, HARV. HEALTH LETTER (Harvard Medical School Health 
Publications Group, Boston, MA), June 1995, at 4. 
72 See Bornstein, supra  note 64, at 577-78. 
73 See Colby, supra note 6, at 452.   
74 See Miller, supra  note 3, at 237. 
75 See Pickens, supra note 2, at 172. 
76 See Miller, supra  note 3, at 237. 
77 See id. at 237-38. 
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 1.  The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)78  
 The ADA prohibits employers from denying employment on the basis of an individual’s 
disability.79  The ADA makes no explicit mention of genetic discrimination, but Congress 
intended a broad reading.80  In fact, the ADA does not specifically identify any single medical 
condition for protection.81  The ADA defines an individual with a disability as a person with one 
or more physical or mental impairments that substantially limits him or her in performing a 
major life activity, a person with a record of such an impairment, or a person regarded as having 
such an impairment.82  The ADA also requires that an employer make reasonable 
accommodations in the workplace, if these accommodations do not impose an undue hardship on 
the employer.83 
 There is little question that the ADA covers an individual who has a genetically related 
disease or disability that has manifested, and substantially limits a major life activity.84  The 
ADA likewise protects individuals who have a prior record of genetically related disability, such 
as someone who has recovered from cancer.85  However, the critical question is whether a 
predisposition to disease, or the diagnosis of a condition without accompanying symptoms, 
constitutes a disability under the ADA.86 
                                                 
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application processes, the hiring, advancement, 
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms ….”). 
80 See id. §§ 12111-12117. 
81 See id.  
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). 
83 See id. § 12112(b) (5) (A). 
84 See Miller, supra  note 3, at 238-39.  See also Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 637, 642 (1998); Harris v. H& W 
Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that an individual with Graves disease is covered by 
the ADA, although the court also held that the disease should be considered in its unmitigated state); Gilday v. 
Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that an individual with diabetes is covered by the ADA, 
and that the disease should be considered in its mitigated state). 
85 See Miller, supra  note 3, at 239. 
86 See Alissa Brownrigg, Note, Mother Still Knows Best: Cancer-Related Gene Mutations, Familial Privacy, and a 
Physician’s Duty to Warn, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 262 (1999). 
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 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) adopted policy guidance, 
stating that the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals based on their genetic 
makeup.87 The policy guidance states the third prong of the definition of disability, the “regarded 
as” prong covers individuals who are subjected to discrimination on the basis of a genetic 
predisposition to illness, disease, or other disorder, even if the disability has not yet manifested.88  
It is the position of the EEOC that discrimination in the workplace based on genetic information 
is exactly the kind of behavior Congress intended to prohibit when it passed the ADA.89  The 
EEOC’s position is clear that the ADA protects individuals with asymptomatic genetic 
conditions from discrimination in the employment arena.90  These EEOC guidelines can be used 
as persuasive authority, but do not have the same force as a  federal statute or regulation.91  
Various concerns and questions are raised following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bragdon v. Abbott,92 interpreting the ADA. 
                                                 
87 See 2 U.S. EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, Order 915.002, at 902-45 (1995).   
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id.   On February 9, 2001, the EEOC filed its first lawsuit challenging genetic testing.  See The U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC PETITIONS COURT TO BAN GENETIC TESTING OF RAILROAD 
WORKERS IN FIRST EEOC CASE CHALLENGING GENETIC TESTING UNDER AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT, (visited Nov. 16 2001) <http://www.eeoc.gov./press/2-9-01-c.html>.  The EEOC petitioned in 
federal district court to enjoin Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad, a Texas based railroad, from engaging in 
genetic testing of its employees who had submitted claims of work related carpal tunnel syndrome.  See id.  The 
EEOC alleged that workers were not told of the genetic tests, nor did they consent to such testing.  See id.  At least 
one worker refused to provide a blood sample based on his suspicions of genetic testing and was threatened with 
immediate discharge.  See id.  The EEOC took the position that the railroads actions violated the ADA and that 
“employers may only require employees to submit to any medical examination if those examinations are job related 
and consistent with business necessity.  Any test which purports to predict future disabilities, whether or not it is 
accurate, is unlikely to be relevant to the employee’s present ability to perform his or her job.”  Id.  On April 19, 
2001, the EEOC announced that it had settled its case against the railroad.  See The U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, EEOC PETITIONS COURT TO BAN GENETIC TESTING OF RAILROAD WORKERS 
IN FIRST EEOC CASE CHALLENGING GENETIC TESTING UNDER AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 
(visited Nov. 16 2001) <http://www.eeoc.gov./press/2-9-01-c.html>.As a part of the settlement the railroad will not: 
directly or indirectly require its employees to submit blood for genetic tests; analyze any blood previously obtained; 
evaluate, analyze or consider any gene test analysis previously performed on any of its employees; or retaliate or 
threaten to take any adverse action against any person who opposed the genetic testing or who participated in EEOC 
proceedings.  
91 See Miller, supra  note 3, at 241. 
92 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
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 In Bragdon, the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a person with 
asymptomatic HIV is an “individual with a disability” under the ADA.93  Although Bragdon was 
not an employment discrimination case, its analysis of the ADA covers the employment 
context.94  The Court found that HIV infection is a “physical impairment” that substantially 
limits the major life activity of reproduction, even in the absence of any manifest visible 
symptoms of the illness.95  The Court recognized that a disability may be based solely upon the 
cellular and molecular changes in the body.96  This reasoning suggests that individuals with 
asymptomatic genetic disorders and genetic predispositions are protected by the ADA, both 
when their condition is viewed as an actual and a perceived impairment.97  Whether or not the 
reasoning in Bragdon will be extended to protect those who test positive for genetic disorders or 
predispositions remains to be seen.  Without judicial decisions, the amount of protection 
provided by the ADA remains unclear. 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist dissenting in Bragdon wrote, “[r]espondent’s argument taken to 
its logical extreme, would render every individual with a genetic marker for some debilitating 
disease ‘disabled’ here because of some future effects.”98  The concern is that since, according to 
scientists, every person has a genetic alteration of some form, which would classify every person 
as disabled.99 
 Three later Supreme Court decisions have significantly narrowed the scope of the ADA, 
and in so doing, may have seriously limited the ADA’s coverage of genetic predisposition 
                                                 
93 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998). 
94 See Miller, supra  note 3, at 242. 
95 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at  639. 
96 See id. 
97 See Miller, supra  note 3, at 244. 
98 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at  661 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
99 See id. 
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discrimination.100  None of these decisions concerned the issue of asymptomatic genetic 
disabilities, but significantly restricted the definition of who is considered a qualified individual 
with a disability.101 
 There is also a channel of thought that ADA coverage depends on the genetic 
predisposition a person has.  Some commentators argue that the ADA would extend to a person 
possessing a predisposition to Huntington’s disease, but that a person possessing the BRCA 1 or 
2 mutation for breast cancer would have a much harder argument to make under the ADA.102  
Both with Huntington’s disease and HIV there is nearly a hundred percent chance of 
manifestation, while with BRCA 1 or 2 gene alteration there is only a fifty-six percent chance of 
developing the disease.103 
 Another reason there is question as to the ADA’s coverage of genetic predispositions is 
that legislation has been introduced in Congress that would make it unlawful to discriminate in 
terms or conditions of employment because of an individual’s genetic information.104  This 
suggests that at least some members of Congress do not believe that the ADA provides adequate 
coverage.  Furthermore, President Clinton signed an executive order that prohibits the federal 
government from discriminating against employees based on disease related genotypes or 
                                                 
100 See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).  
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).  The Court held in these cases that actual impairments 
must be considered in their corrected or mitigated state when determining whether they are disabilities under Title I 
of the ADA.  See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487; Albertsons, 527 U.S. at 565; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 520. 
101 See Miller, supra  note 3, at 245. 
102 See Eugenia Liu, Bragdon v. Abbott: Extending the Americans with Disabilities Act to Asymptomatic Individuals, 
3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 382, 393 (2000). 
103 See id. at 396 (the BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 genetic predisposition combined with a family history of breast cancer 
significantly increases the chance of developing the disease). 
104 See Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act of 1999, S. 1322, 106th Cong. (1999); 
H.R. 2457, 106th Cong. (1999). 
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genetic mutations.105  It seems that these would be largely redundant and unnecessary if the ADA 
provided adequate protection. 
2.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
One limited source of protection against genetic discrimination under current federal law 
is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), which prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.106  Therefore, Title VII 
will likely provide protection against certain forms of genetic discrimination that have a 
significant correlation to race, national origin, religion, or gender.107  Since genetic screening is a 
facially neutral policy, claims under Title VII would have to be brought under the theory of 
disparate impact.108  That means the employee would have to show that the hiring decision was 
based upon a neutral factor that had a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected class.109  
Only a fraction of genetic conditions and mutations are known to be associated with a particular 
class, therefore Title VII does not provide adequate protection against genetic discrimination in 
the workplace.110 
B.  Executive Order 13145  
On February 8, 2000, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13145, “To Prohibit 
Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on Genetic Information.”111  The executive order 
precludes federal employers from requesting, requiring, collecting, or purchasing genetic 
                                                 
105 See Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (2000). 
106 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) 
107 See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998). 
108 See Rachinsky, supra  note 41, at 589. 
109 See id.  
110 See id. at 590.  Some examples of genetic conditions associated with certain classes sickle-cell (individuals of 
African American descent) or Tay-Sachs (Ashkenazi Jews).  See Miller, supra  note 3, at 247-48.   
111 Genetic Exec. Order, 6,875, 6,877. 
 17 
information from applicants and employees.112  The order also prohibits federal employers from 
using protected genetic information in a manner that deprives employees of advancement 
opportunities.113  An exception allows for the genetic testing of applicants if the obtained 
information is to be used exclusively to determine whether further evaluation is needed to 
diagnose a current medical condition that could prevent the applicant from performing the 
essential job functions.114  The weakness of Executive Order 13145 is obvious in that it is only 
applicable to federal employers.  This is due to a lack of executive power, thus leaving further 
protections in the hands of the federal and state legislatures.  
C.  Current State Law: Employment Discrimination 
 Currently, nearly half of the states have legislation prohibiting genetic discrimination in 
the workplace.115  The form and coverage, protections afforded, and enforcement schemes of 
these statutes vary considerably.  The earliest state legislation addressing genetic discrimination 
in the workplace prohibited employers from “discriminating against individuals possessing 
particular genetic traits or disorders.”116   
 In the 1990’s, a number of states passed more comprehensive statutes, which either 
prohibit employers from requiring genetic testing as a condition of employment or which 
                                                 
112 See id. at 6,878-79.  Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination by federal 
employers in the same manner as the ADA applies to private employers.  See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (g) (1994).  Thus, the 
Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination by the federal government on the basis of genetic information to the 
same extent as the ADA.  See id. 
113 See Genetic Exec. Order, 6,875, 6,877. 
114 See Genetic Exec. Order, 6,875, 6,879. 
115 As of August 2001, twenty-two states have statutes that prohibit genetic discrimination in employment: Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin.  See Joseph J. Wang,  Health Law and Policy Inst., Genetic Nondiscrimination Laws in Employment 
(visited Nov. 6, 2001) <http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlawperspectives/Genetics/010830Genetic.html>. 
116 See Miller, supra  note 3, at 259.  For example, Florida prohibits entities from denying or refusing employment to 
any person or discharging any person from employment based on the sickle-cell trait. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
448.076 (West 2000).  A North Caroline statute has nearly identical provisions and also covers individuals with the 
hemoglobin C trait.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1 (2001).  New Jersey prohibits employment discrimination based 
on the sickle-cell trait, the hemoglobin C trait, the thalassemia trait, the Tay-Sachs trait, or the cystic fibrosis trait.  
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-5, 10:5-12 (West 2001).  
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prohibit the use of genetic information in employment decisions, or work as combination of the 
two.117  Seventeen states prohibit employers from requiring genetic testing.118  Michigan is one 
of these states.119  In March of 2000, the Michigan Legislature passed a series of bills dealing 
with genetic issues.120  The Governor’s Commission on Genetic Privacy and Progress, which 
completed a two-year study in February 1999, shaped the content of Michigan bills addressing 
genetic discrimination.121  The applicable Michigan statute provides that except as otherwise 
provided by federal law, an employer shall not require an individual to submit to a genetic test or 
to provide genetic information as a condition of employment or promotion.122   
Twelve states go further by prohibiting requiring genetic testing in employment, and 
prohibiting employers from even requesting genetic testing or information.123  Some states 
additionally prohibit employment discrimination based on genetic information obtained from 
sources other than genetic tests.124  New Jersey’s law, the most comprehensive, prohibits genetic 
discrimination based on categories including “genetic information,” “atypical hereditary cellular 
or blood trait,” or “because of the refusal to submit to a genetic test or make available the results 
of a genetic test to an employer.”125  The current patchwork of state laws has begun to address 
the issue of genetic discrimination, but often provides either inadequate protection or no 
                                                 
117 See Miller, supra  note 3, at 260.   
118 These states are: California, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin.  See Wang, 
supra note 115. 
119 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1202 (West 2001). 
120 See Wesley Hsu, Communities of Color & Genetics Policy Project, A Review of Genetics State Laws in Alabama 
and Michigan (visited Nov. 6, 2001) 
<http://www.sph.umich.edu/genpolicy/current/newsletter/jun2000/state_laws.html>. 
121 See id. 
122 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1202 (West 2001). 
123 See Wang, supra  note 115.  These states are: California, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.  See id. 
124 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1A (1999). 
125 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 2001). 
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enforcement mechanisms.  Federal legislation is necessary to address these inadequacies of state 
law protections for employees and to provide employers with a uniform law.   
D. Current Federal Law: Health Insurance Discrimination 
 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”),126 is the only 
federal law that directly addresses the issue of genetic discrimination and provides some limited 
protections from discrimination on the basis of genetic information in health insurance.  The law 
only applies to employer based and group health insurance plans that are commercially issued.127  
Under HIPAA, it is prohibited for a group health insurance plan to “establish rules for eligibility 
(including continued eligibility) of any individual to enroll under the terms of the plan based on 
… health status-related factors in relation to the individual or a dependant of the individual 
[including] … [g]enetic information.”128  The statute further prohibits the using of the results of 
genetic tests as evidence of a preexisting condition, if the actual disease has not been 
diagnosed.129  The statute protects individuals changing from one health insurance plan to 
another and also protects uninsured individuals applying for group coverage.130  In general, 
HIPAA makes it possible for individuals to get insurance coverage when they have past or 
present medical problems, and to maintain coverage when they change jobs or insurance.131  
Specifically, the Act provides important protections for individuals who have preexisting 
conditions such as a genetic predisposition, and therefore, are afraid to change jobs or insurance 
for fear of losing their coverage.132 
                                                 
126 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (1999). 
127 See id. 
128 See Rachinsky, supra  note 41, at 593. 
129 See id. 
130 See Pickens, supra  note 2, at 174. 
131 See Miller, supra  note 3, at 255.   
132 See id. 
 20 
 However, due to the fact that the provisions of HIPAA apply only to group health 
insurers, it does not ban insurers from using genetic information in the individual insurance 
market.133  Furthermore, the statute does not “prevent plans from charging more to all members 
of a group plan, such as an entire office, because of the genetic makeup of a specific member of 
the group.”134  Moreover, HIPAA does not prohibit health insurers from requesting or requiring 
genetic tests.135  Additionally, a high burden is placed on the plaintiff to prove that insurance 
coverage was denied because of genetic information.136  At first glance, HIPAA seems to provide 
adequate protection for individuals, but “it retains sufficient loopholes for health insurers to 
discriminate against individuals with a ‘negative’ genetic makeup.”137  While HIPAA is a good 
start, it still remains deficient in protecting individuals from genetic discrimination in the health 
insurance context.   Additional legislation will be needed to address the loopholes that remain for 
health insurers to discriminate based on genetic information. 
E. Current State Law: Health Insurance Discrimination 
 Early states laws enacted to protect against genetic discrimination for health insurance 
like employment was limited in scope.138  Since the inception of the Human Genome Project 
(HGP) in 1990, a number of states have enacted statutes employing broader definitions of 
genetic information.139  Some of the recent statutes have more comprehensive definitions of 
“genetic testing” or “genetic characteristics” that cover tests for genes or mutations in genes that 
                                                 
133 See Natalie E. Zindorf, Comment, Discrimination in the 21st Century: Protecting the Privacy of Genetic 
Information in Employment and Insurance, 36 TULSA L.J. 703, 719 (2001). 
134 Miller, supra note 3, at 255-56. 
135 See Rachinsky, supra note 41, at 593-94. 
136 See Pickens, supra note 2, at 174-75. 
137 Smith, supra note 14, at 716. 
138 For example, Maryland’s insurance statute prohibited health and life insurers from treating individuals differently 
with respect to ratings, premium payments, or dividends based on genetic traits, but only for “sickle-cell trait, 
thalassemia-minor trait, hemoglobin C trait, [or] Tay-Sachs trait.”  MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 223(a)(3), (b)(4) (1997).  
This statute has been amended to be more comprehensive.  See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-909(b) (2000). 
139 See Rachinsky, supra note 41, at 585. 
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are associated with diseases or disorders.140  The expansion of the term “genetic testing” in 
various statutes provides more protection for individual privacy.141  Currently, forty-six states 
have enacted laws prohibiting insurers from using genetic information to discriminate against 
individuals.142  These statutes typically fall into one of two categories.  The first group prohibits 
health insurers from using genetic information about an individual except for research or 
investigative purposes.143  The second group specifically names prohibited uses of genetic 
information.144  
State legislation varies significantly in scope, and some states explicitly prohibit 
information “ranging from family medical history to DNA testing, while others ban 
discrimination based on chromosomal test results alone.”145  In almost every state that has laws 
prohibiting genetic discrimination, the laws apply to both the group and individual health 
insurance providers.146  The scope of protection in each state is dependant on the definition of 
“genetic information” in the statutory language.  If the definition is broader, the scope of 
protection is broader.147  This is most important in determining whether family history will be 
considered a part of genetic information.148   
 In Michigan, new legislation forbids Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, health 
insurers, and health maintenance organizations (HMOs) from: 1) requiring insured persons or 
applicants to submit to genetic testing before issuing, reviewing, or continuing a policy; and 2) 
                                                 
140 See id. at 586. 
141 See id. 
142 Only Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington have no general genetic nondiscrimination laws in health 
insurance.  See Joseph J. Wang,  Health Law and Policy Inst., Genetic Nondiscrimination Laws in Health Insurance 
(visited Nov. 6, 2001) <http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlawperspectives/Genetics/010831HealthIns..html>.  
143 See William F. Mullholland II & Ami S. Jaeger, Genetic Privacy and Legislation: A Survey of State Legislation, 
39 JURIMETRICS J. 317, 318 (1999). 
144 See id. 
145 See Zindorf, supra note 133, at 719-20. 
146 See Wang, supra  note 142 (Alaska, Texas, and Wyoming genetic discrimination laws only apply in the group 
health insurance context, not the individual market). 
147 Id. 
148 See id. 
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sharing whether genetic testing has been conducted and/or the results of the genetic testing or 
genetic information that has been collected.149   The statute does not prohibit an insurer or an 
HMO from requiring an applicant to answer questions concerning family history as a precursor 
to coverage.150  
 The majority of current laws address the use of genetic information in the context of 
health insurance, which has primarily been regulated at the state level.  However, in practice, 
state laws do not reach many insurers, due to preemption by the federal Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),151 which preempts state laws that regulate self-insured 
employee health plans.152  Consequently, there is a need for  more comprehensive  federal 
legislation to protect against discrimination by the health care industry based on genetic 
information. 
F. Pending  Federal Legislation 
 For the fourth  straight year,153 the United States Congress is attempting to pass 
comprehensive legislation banning genetic discrimination in employment and health insurance.  
Currently, there are several pieces of recently introduced legislation that deal with the issue of 
discrimination in either employment, insurance, or both, based on genetic information.  On 
February 16, 2001, the Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act 
(Senate Bill 318 & House Bill 602) was introduced in the Senate by Senator Tom Daschle (D-
SD) and in the House of Representatives by Representative Louise Slaughter (D-NY).154   
                                                 
149 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3407(b) (West 2001). 
150 See id. 
151 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1999). 
152 See Rachinsky, supra note 41, at 587-88. 
153 Legislation was proposed by both the 105th and 106th  Congress to combat genetic discrimination.  See H.R. 
306, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 89, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2457, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1322, 106th Cong. (1999). 
154 See S. 318, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 602, 107th Cong. (2001).  The House bill had 152 bipartisan co-sponsors, 
including Connie Morella (R-MD) who joined Slaughter in introducing the bill.  See American Medical Association, 
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 In the area of employment discrimination this pending legislation would make it illegal 
for an employer to fire, refuse to hire, or otherwise discriminate against an individual based on 
genetic information.155  With a few exceptions, the proposed legislation would also make it 
illegal for an employer to request, require, collect or purchase protected genetic information with 
respect to an individual or a family member of the individual.156  The exception allows for an 
employer to request, require, collect or purchase such information where needed to monitor the 
adverse effects of hazardous workplace exposures or with the consent of the employee.157  The 
same or similar provisions apply to employment agencies, labor organizations, and training 
programs.158 
 Three major provisions of the proposed legislation address genetic discrimination in 
health insurance.  First, it would prohibit use of genetic information in determining eligibility or 
in adjusting premium rates.159  Second, it would prohibit health insurers from requesting or 
requiring individuals or their family members to undergo genetic testing.160  Third, it would 
prohibit health insurers from requesting or requiring an individual or their family members to 
provide genetic information.161 The proposed legislation would apply to both group and 
individual health insurance programs, including state regulated plans and those regulated by the 
federal government under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).162  
                                                                                                                                                             
Genetic Discrimination Legislative Update (visited Nov. 16, 2001) <http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/3999..html>. 
155 See Watson Wyatt Insider, Bill Pending in Congress on Genetic Discrimination (visited Nov. 6, 2001) 
<http://www.watsonwyatt.com/homepage/us/new/Insider/new/2001/2001_10_04.asp>. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. 
158 See S. 318, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 602, 107th Cong. (2001).   
159 See Watson Wyatt, supra note 155. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. 
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Thus, addressing a significant loophole from HIPAA by including individual health insurance 
programs.   
 A significant part of S. 318/H.R. 602 is that it provides individuals the right to bring 
unlimited action in federal or state courts for violations by insurance plans or employers.163  This 
allows claimants to bypass the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and file 
immediately in federal or state court.164  Once in court S. 318/H.R. 602 allows for unlimited 
compensatory and punitive damages.165 
Congressional committee meetings are currently being held to determine the best way to 
keep genetic information out of employment and health care decisions.166  Senate 318 has been 
referred to the Senate Health Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, which held hearings on 
the bill July 25, 2001 and February 13, 2002.167  House Bill 602 has been referred to the House 
Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health, the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health, 
and the Education and the Workforce Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations.168  Both 
bills would be effective October 1, 2002.169  As of April 5, S. 318 has been supported 26 
cosponsors, all Democrat, and H.R. 602 has been supported 259 cosponsors (more than a 
majority), bipartisan.170  A key issue that hearings have focused on is whether current laws, such 
as the ADA and HIPAA provide adequate protection, and whether proposed legislation is 
consistent with existing discrimination statutes.171 
                                                 
163 See Protecting Against Genetic Discrimination: The Limits of Existing Laws: Hearing Before the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Ronald L. Adler, Laurdan 
Associates, Inc.) 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 See S. 318, 107th Cong. (2001); information available at (visited April 5, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov/>. 
167 See id. 
168 See H.R. 602. 107th Cong. (2001); information available at (visited April 5, 2001)< http://thomas.loc.gov/>. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. 
171 See Watson Wyatt, supra note 155. 
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 Another pending bill, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act 
of 2001 (Senate Bill 382), was introduced by Senator Olympia Snow on February 15, 2001.172  
The bill currently has six cosponsors.173   This bill though similar to S. 318/ H.R. 602, only 
contemplates discrimination in health insurance and its coverage of health insurance 
discrimination is not as comprehensive as S.318/H.R.602.174  Senate Bill 382 similar to S. 318 
and H.R. 602 applies to both individual and group health insurance programs.175   
A significant difference is that S. 382 stipulates that an insurance company may “request, 
but not require” genetic information from clients.176  This is in contrast to S. 318 and H.R. 602, 
which prohibit even the request for information without the authorization of the individual.177  
The potential problem is that insurance companies could potentially pass off requests as 
requirements.  Another significant difference is that S. 382 does not have an enforcement clause 
like the one provided in S. 318/H.R. 602, which  allows for unlimited action in federal or state 
courts.178  Without significant penalties it is unlikely legislation will deter employers and health 
insurers from discriminating based on an individuals genetic information.     
 The measures in S. 382 would prevent individual health insurers and group health plans 
from discriminating against individuals on the basis of “predictive” genetic information.179  The 
bill would also prohibit health insurers from adjusting premiums from groups based on 
“predictive” genetic information.180  A health insurer under this bill cannot require an individual 
                                                 
172 See S. 382, 107th Cong. (2001); information available at (visited April 5, 2002) <http://thomas.loc.gov/>. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
176 See OLPA, supra  note 5. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
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to give “predictive” genetic information, but can request it.181  The word  “predictive” also 
highlights another difference between S. 382 and S. 318/H.R. 602 , which use the word 
“potential.”182  The National Association of Health Underwriters (NAHU) favors S. 382 for fear 
that the S. 318/ H.R.602 “potential” language is so broad that it will disrupt and prevent the 
normal underwriting process.183   
Senate Bill 382 exempts genetic information from protection if it is “derived from 
physical tests, such as the chemical, blood, or urine analyses of the individual including 
cholesterol tests.”184   Since the majority of genetic information is collected in this manner, this 
definition excluding nearly all genetic information from protection renders the bill inadequate to 
protect against genetic discrimination.  Furthermore, S. 382 does not provide protection for 
information that is discovered through tests not intended to reveal genetic information.185  A 
close study of the definitions and exceptions provided by the proposed bill indicates that the bill 
would provide very minimal protections from genetic discrimination by health insurers and no 
protections from genetic discrimination in the employment arena.  On February 13, 2002 the 
Committee on Health Education, Labor, and Pensions held hearings for S. 318 and S. 382 
addressing some of these concerns.186  
 On March 6, 2002 Senator Snowe introduced a new bill backed by Republicans, the 
Genetic Information Non-Discrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act of 2002 
(Senate Bill 1995).187  The bill was referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
                                                 
181 Id. 
182 See NAHU, Issues: Genetic Discrimination, (visited April 6, 2002) 
<http://www.nahu.org/governmnet/issues/genetic_discrimination/>. 
183 See id.  The intent of the Daschle/Slaughter bill is to keep the definition sufficiently broad to close any loophole 
that might in some way lead to genetic discrimination.  See id. 
184 S. 382, 107th Cong. (2001); information available at (visited April 5, 2002) <http://thomas.loc.gov/>. 
185 See id. 
186 See id. 
187 See S. 1995, 107th Cong. (2002); information available at (visited April 5, 2002) <http://thomas.loc.gov/>. 
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Pensions, and currently has eight cosponsors.188  The proposed legislation was an effort to find 
some common ground with S. 318/ H.R. 602.189  However, significant differences still remain.    
The employment part of the bill is drafted to prohibit the use of genetic information in 
employment decisions, including in hiring, firing , and promotions.190  Employers would only be 
able to collect genetic information in limited circumstances, such as monitoring the effect of 
workplace hazards.191  Genetic information that is obtained by employers would be 
confidentially protected.192  The health insurance portion of the bill prohibits health insurers, 
issuers and group health plans from using genetic information ,including family history, to deny 
coverage or to set premiums and rates.193  Health plans that hold genetic information would have 
to treat it in compliance with existing privacy rules.194   
The EEOC would enforce all provisions of the bill, which is different from S. 318/H.R. 
602 which provide for direct access to the courts.195  This is significant in that under S. 318/ H.R. 
602 a claimant can make the decision of filing suit through the EEOC or can directly bring an 
action in federal or state court.  Under the provisions of S. 1995 a claimant is forced to file its 
suit through the EEOC.  Furthermore, S. 1995 does not provide for the unlimited compensatory 
and punitive damages that are available under S. 318/H.R. 602.  As a point of compromise, S. 
1995 by providing the EEOC enforcement clause makes it a more meaningful deterrent than S. 
382.     
                                                 
188 See id. 
189 See Genetic Alliance March 2002 Alert, Genetic Nondiscrimination: Is a deal in sight?, (visited April 6,  2002) 
<http://www.geneticalliance.org/alert.html>. 
190 See CCH Federal Law Changes, Summary of Federal Law Changes – March 2002, (visited April 6, 2002) 
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192 See id. 
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A significant weakness of S. 1995 is that it exempts from protection the exact same forms 
of genetic information that are excluded under S. 382.196  By excluding genetic information that 
is obtained from blood tests, urine tests, and information discovered through a test not intended 
to reveal genetic information, the proposed legislation does not adequately protect individuals 
from genetic discrimination in the workplace or by health insurers.  The definition, when 
examined, indicates that only a minimal amount of genetic information will be protected.   
Senate Bill 1995 with the employment discrimination and enforcement provisions represents an 
effort in coming to a compromise on some form of genetic discrimination legislation.  However, 
as drafted S. 1995 provides inadequate protections to address public fears of discrimination.  
More comprehensive legislation such as S. 318/ H.R. 602 will be needed to address and alleviate 
public fears of genetic discrimination.  Thus, contributing to research, public health, and the 
general welfare of society. President Bush in a March 2002 statement indicated support for 
legislation such as S. 1995, and characterized the bills protections as “fair, reasonable and 
consistent with existing laws.”197          
III. ANALYSIS & PROPOSAL 
A. Argument for Protections Against Employment Discrimination 
Employers can learn employees or potential employees genetic information through 
genetic testing, company medical exams, family history, or medical records.198  Employers have 
the authority to monitor employees and want employees who are physically and mentally fit.199   
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Employers also have a valid interest in an individuals’ health that may pose a hazard to the 
applicant, to others or to the business.200  However, beyond this valid interest (,) employment 
decisions should be based on merit, not on speculative information about potential diseases or 
disorders that may never develop.   
A genetic test may inform the employer of an individual’s potential future medical 
condition, but not the individual’s present ability to perform the specific job.201  Requiring of 
genetic testing is becoming a wide spread practice.202  The problem that arises is that employers 
are using these tests to protect from future problems that may arise from a potential medical 
condition, rather than looking at the individual’s present ability to do the job.   
Concerns about discrimination arise when employers begin to express interest in genetic 
information that is not related to the job.  Employers are increasingly finding this as a way of 
assessing risk and avoiding possible increased operating expenses down the road.203  Plain and 
simple employers do not want to hire someone who may develop a disease, and have to cover the 
costs such as absences from work, extra costs of recruitment and training a replacement, early 
retirement, worker’s compensation, or excessive use of healthcare benefits. 
 One problem associated with potential genetic discrimination in the workplace is that 
individuals will not undergo a genetic screening for fear that it may result in future 
discrimination by an employer.204  Genetic testing at times can be a lifesaving measure, and 
individuals should not have to fear adverse consequences in the employment arena based on the 
result of a genetic test.205  A study by the National Center for Genome Research (NCGR) 
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indicates that thirty-six percent of people surveyed would not take genetic tests for fear that their 
employer could get access to the results.206  This behavior results in negative consequences both 
for the individual who does not get tested and for the advancement of scientific research in this 
area.207  This fear is clearly not unwarranted.  In the Burlington Northern Railroad case examined 
earlier, Burlington North admitted to using genetic testing to determine if employees who had 
developed carpal tunnel syndrome had a predisposition to the disease.208  Furthermore, 
employees who refused to be tested were threatened with discipline or even termination.209  The 
concern is also illustrated in the case of the woman who was terminated from her job after 
finding out she had a BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 genetic predisposition to breast cancer.210  
Comprehensive legislation needs to be enacted that will prevent employers from abusing genetic 
information in this manner.     
 Another problem associated with genetic information being used in the workplace is that 
employers are likely to misuse and misinterpret health risks based on a common misconception 
that having a genetic trait is the same as having the disease or disorder.211  A genetic trait may 
mean an increased risk of a certain disease, but does not mean the individual is afflicted with the 
disease or disorder.  In some cases there is only a slight risk of being afflicted with the disease or 
disorder, and with other traits the probability is much higher.212  Employers may discriminate 
against a carrier because of this fundamental misconception that genetic trait might affect a 
persons health or capabilities.213  Being susceptible to a disease or disorder, does not always 
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determine the onset of a disease or disorder, often times a persons lifestyle choices and the 
environment have a serious effect on the overall health and the potential of the onset of a disease 
or disorder on a certain individual.214  It is unjustified for an employer to discriminate based on a 
mere medical speculation, when decisions should be based on merit.   
 Information pertaining to an individual’s body and state of health is a matter, which an 
individual is ordinarily entitled to privacy.215  Allowing employers access to genetic information 
poses several legal and ethical dilemmas that could better addressed with legislation directed at 
employment discrimination based on genetic information.  Genetic information should only be 
used by individuals in consultation with their doctors, to make the best diagnostic and treatments 
decision possible.216   
Laws should be enacted which prevent employers from requiring employees to undergo 
genetic testing or using results of genetic tests as a basis for adverse discriminatory employment 
decisions.217   Under certain limited circumstances employers should be able to use genetic 
testing and the use of genetic information in the workplace to ensure workplace safety and health 
and to preserve research opportunities.218  However, in all cases where genetic information is 
obtained it should be maintained as confidential medical records separate from personnel files.219  
An employer should be permitted to monitor employees for the effects of a particular substance 
found in the workplace to which continued exposure could cause genetic damage under certain 
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circumstances.220  Second, an employer may use the results only to identify and control adverse 
conditions in the workplace and to take action necessary to prevent significant risk of substantial 
harm to the employee or others.221  Once again it is important that informed consent and 
confidentiality are required.222   
Legislation addressing all of these points “should apply to public and private-sector 
employees, unions and labor management groups that conduct joint apprenticeship and other 
training programs.  Employment agencies and licensing agencies that issue licenses, certificates, 
and other credentials required to engage in various professions and occupations also should be 
covered.”223  Courts should be given the authority to halt violations and order relief, including 
but not limited to order to halt violations and order of relief, such as hiring, promotion, back pay, 
and compensatory and punitive damages to the individual.224  
Antidiscrimination law “is built upon the premise that applicants and employees must be 
selected based on their ability to do the job and not on myths, fears, stereotypes regarding race, 
gender, age, religion, or disability.”225  Just as it is illegal to refuse to hire an individual based on 
their race or gender, it should be illegal to make employment decisions based upon genetic 
information rather than an individual’s ability to do the work.226  “It is simply bad science to use 
the presence of a predictive genetic trait or marker to make workplace decisions because those 
traits cannot predict how well that person will succeed in the workplace …. Society should not 
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allow employers to assign a negative value to genetic markers that have no effect on one’s ability 
to perform in their job.”227   
Comprehensive legislation needs to be enacted that will protect individuals from not 
being hired or being fired based on genetic information.  Such discrimination is particularly 
unfair  because it is based on characteristics that an individual is powerless to change.  An 
individual’s genetic makeup should not be substituted for qualifications, and no employer should 
ever review as such when the ability of an individual to perform the essential job functions is 
unaffected.  Legislation needs to be enacted that will alleviate public fears of employers using 
genetic information in a discriminatory manner.  While the ADA and some state legislation may 
offer some protections in the employment context, further legislation is needed to combat 
discrimination in the workplace based on genetic information.   
B.  Argument for Insurance Protection 
 The historic purpose of insurance has typically been to “protect the insured against the 
economic consequences of fortuitous events.”228  A “‘fortuitous’ event is one that occurs by 
chance, without obvious causation, unexpectedly, or not according to the usual course of 
things.”229  Of course, a profit for the insurance company is also figured into the system.230  In 
the individual market, where risk is high compared to the group market, family medical history 
has traditionally played a role in the underwriting process.231  Underwriting “involves evaluating 
a person’s risk of accident, disease, or death, and based on the relevant risk, applicants are 
classified into groups and charged premiums accordingly.”232  The underlying principle of 
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insurance underwriting is “fair discrimination” based on efficient, actuarial analysis in 
establishing risk transference and risk distribution.233  In underwriting risks, insurance companies 
attempt “to measure as accurately as is practicable the burden shifted to the insurance fund by the 
policyholder and to charge exactly for it, no more and no less.  To do so is ‘fair’ discrimination  
…. Not to do so is unfair discrimination.”234   
There is an argument that if health insurers were restricted from certain genetic 
information, normal underwriting procedures would be disrupted, which would result in 
increased premiums throughout the market.235  Supporters of underwriting further argue that use 
of genetic testing is fair discrimination because it is based on “sound actuarial analysis.”236  
However, this section will show that discrimination based on genetic testing is neither fair nor 
sound.     
Health insurance companies could potentially save millions of dollars if they could use 
predictive genetics to identify in advance, and then reject, policy applicants who are predisposed 
to certain diseases and disorders.237  With regard to genetic information, insurance companies 
continue assert that this information that can be used to predict symptoms or susceptibility are 
imperative to risk assessment.238  Regardless, of whether the disclosure is necessary for efficient 
continuation of insurance policies, experience shows that this information can expose people to 
increased premiums, cancellation of policies, loss of employment, and other negative effects.239     
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The problem is that the unfamiliarity with particulars in gene theory may result in 
unwarranted negative judgments, such as discrimination based on the finding of one bad gene, 
which does not mean the person has a genetic disease.  Even if genetic science were completely 
accurate, which it is not, predictions based on genetic test results are not conclusive.240  The 
genetic test may reveal that an individual is more susceptible to developing a particular disease 
or disorder in comparison with the rest of the population, but environmental and behavioral 
factors play key roles in determining whether the individual is actually afflicted.241  Furthermore, 
genetic flaws can also be affected by behavioral changes and medical intervention.242  The 
problem is that when medical underwriters  rely on genetic tests these other factors are 
overlooked.  Special protection of genetic information is justified by how unique it is, and by 
how likely it is that insurers will misuse and misinterpret this information.  Without special 
protection health insurance companies without sufficient genetic understanding will make 
decisions that are unfair and discriminatory. 
 Many advocates of legislation protecting against genetic discrimination do not believe 
that family medical history should be included in the definition of genetic discrimination.243  
They argue that family medical history has long been a part of patient information.244  The 
National Association of Health Underwriters (NAHU) “supports the prohibition of the use of 
genetic information in the health insurance underwriting process as long as the definition of 
genetic information is limited to DNA, RNA and related gene testing.”245  It is the position of the  
NAHU that the expanding of the definition of genetic information to include an individual’s 
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personal and family medical history will interfere with the normal health insurance underwriting 
process.246  The NAHU favor S. 382 over S. 318 and H.R. 602 because the definition of genetic 
information is not as broad in S. 382.247  The problem with this argument is that when personal 
and family medical history are not included in the definition of genetic information, health 
insurance companies are permitted genetic tests by other means.  What this means is that health 
insurance companies will be permitted to “use crude, old-fashioned, relatively less reliable, 
twenty-first-century means of collecting the data from the same people.”248  The health insurance 
companies would just use personal medical history and family history to learn what they could 
about a person’s genetic makeup for the purposes of underwriting.  It would make no sense for 
the law to allow a health insurance company to do by a less reliable means what it is barred from 
doing by more reliable means.249 
 Other health insurers fear that consumers will use their knowledge about their own 
genetic predisposition for particular diseases or medical conditions to “adversely select” against 
insurance companies.250  The argument is that this will force the insurer to increase the premium 
price for insurance coverage to cover all of these unexpected claims.251  The fear is that adverse 
selection will increase as genetic information becomes available to individuals.252  However, this 
argument is unpersuasive.  If insurers were denied the use of genetic information , then insurers 
as a class would be equally subject to additional costs associated with adverse selection.253  
Therefore, if all insurers were proportionally affected by adverse selection, then no single insurer 
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would be at a competitive disadvantage.254  This is certainly a problem, but is outweighed by the 
potential for unfair discrimination and unfair results that could result in a violation of an 
individuals civil rights when genetic information is used.   
 If insurance companies are permitted to use genetic information the result will be those 
who least need coverage will obtain it at reasonable rates, while those who need it most will 
either be denied coverage or unable to afford coverage.255   If not denied coverage completely 
individuals who are a genetic risk will be offered an exclusion or coverage limited by a low 
maximum financial limit, or a cap for treatment of the genetic defect.256  This is not good policy 
for those most in need of health insurance to be the individuals least likely to be the ones to get 
the coverage needed.  This will be the result if insurance companies are allowed to abuse genetic 
information. 
 An individual’s genetic makeup is entirely beyond voluntary choice.257  Arguably 
because of this there should be no duty to pay more for insurance because of genetic makeup.258  
The “nature and purpose of insurance is risk transference and distribution, or fairly redistributing 
and equally sharing the fortuitous risks among all policy holders …. Fair risk redistribution is a 
matter of equal fairness for all of us because all of us are genetically unequal.”259  Basically 
because genetic makeup is morally arbitrary it should not be the basis for ones treatment by 
health insurance companies.  The argument then goes on that “[e]ach of us is genetically 
different and potentially unequal in insurance classifications, but we attain equality through 
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socializing and redistributing our immutable genetic risks.”260  This way everyone receives value 
through insurance.261   
 The majority of individuals rely on health insurance to absorb most of their health care 
costs.262  Denial of health insurance may result in a denial of health care period, and this inaction 
then leads the burden of health care being shifted to the taxpayer.263  This is a cost that should be 
spread among the insured.  The insurance companies should not be allowed to include genetic 
information in its rate setting, and should spread these costs evenly among the insured. 
 Another argument against allowing insurance companies to use genetic information is 
that individuals may decide not to have genetic testing done for fear of the potential 
consequences.  There is the potential that an individual would rather not know about a genetic 
defect, rather than be penalized when trying to obtain health insurance.264  This a serious 
problem considering the value an individual may receive from a genetic test, yet individuals have 
to weigh the risks as to whether they are better off not knowing for fearing of adverse effects in 
health insurance.  The primary concern of individuals who choose not to participate in a genetic 
test is fear of losing health insurance.265  The statistic indicates there is a need for legislation that 
addresses individual’s fear of being denied or losing health insurance based on a genetic testing, 
which can potentially be a lifesaving measure.     
Legal measures should be pursued at the federal and state levels to protect individuals 
from such discrimination.  Health insurers should be prohibited from declining to cover or 
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overcharging individuals known to carry genetic predispositions.  They should also be prohibited 
from mandating genetic testing.  Health insurers should have minimal use for genetic 
information because the focus is on short-term problems.266  Genetic testing reveals information 
with regard to an  individuals long-term health risks, which is insignificant considering most 
individuals stay with insurance companies for a short period of time.267   
Until medical underwriting is no longer performed, legislation is needed to protect 
individuals from genetic discrimination.  According to one lead expert in the field “[i]nsurance is 
a method of risk-sharing against the unknown, and the more the unknown becomes knowable in 
advance, the less the current system makes sense.  We need to think of ways of restructuring our 
insurance system … to accommodate this ability to predict future risks.”268  Legislation 
preventing the use of genetic information by medical underwriters is the way to take into account 
the increased ability to predict future risk, and keep genetic information, which is of minimal 
significance private from the insurers.  Insurance companies should be forbidden to use 
individual’s genetic information to deny them coverage or to raise their premiums.  In addition, 
insurance companies should not be allowed to use genetic information or family history of 
disease to deny anyone coverage or to raise their premiums.   
Federal legislation is needed to protect individuals from genetic discrimination, a form of 
discrimination needing protection just as racial, ethnic, age and sexual discrimination.   This type 
of legislation will force insurers to make decisions based on an individual’s actual state of health 
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rather than genetic information that is affected by many factors, which cannot be reduced to a 
risk determination.  Genetic testing is extremely uncertain in its predictions, and it is unfair to 
use this data to determine insurance coverage or costs.  The insurance industry should be forced 
to spread genetic risks across the entire pool of insureds to ensure those with genetic 
predispositions are not discriminated against.      
C.  Current Legislation Is Inadequate  
Currently, the law fails to sufficiently address genetic discrimination.  There are 
respective arguments, both for and against, further legislation regulating the use of genetic 
information.  Critics of further legislation concerning genetic discrimination argue that it is 
unnecessary because of existing statutes such as the ADA and HIPAA, and that any further 
legislation would be inconsistent with existing discrimination statutes.269   
 The ADA is clearly lacking in its protection against genetic discrimination in the 
workplace.  First, it is possible and highly likely that the ADA does not protect genetic 
predispositions that have not manifested.270  The law is unclear as to whether these genetic 
predispositions are considered disabilities.  Another major disadvantage of the ADA is that it 
only applies to employers with fifteen or more employees, thereby excluding a large number of 
small employers from complying with the ADA.271  Furthermore, the public fear of genetic 
discrimination indicates that the ADA currently provides inadequate protection. 
Although a great start, HIPAA also fails to provide adequate protections against genetic 
discrimination.  First, HIPPA does not require an employer to provide a health plan, and if an 
employer does provide such as plan, HIPAA does not require the inclusion of certain benefits.272  
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Plans may exclude certain coverage of a particular condition or place a lifetime cap on certain 
benefits, provided it is not directed at certain individuals.  A second,  major disadvantage of 
HIPAA is that it does not help uninsured individuals who apply for individual coverage.273  A 
third weakness of HIPAA is that it leaves open the possibility that all members of an insured 
group may be charged at a higher premium based upon the genetic information of one person.274  
Additionally, premiums are not controlled by HIPAA as long as similarly situated individuals in 
the plan are charged the same amount.275  Furthermore, HIPAA does not prohibit insurers from 
requiring genetic tests as a condition for coverage, nor does it restrict the releasing of that 
information to other sources.276  Finally, HIPAA does not prevent insurers from raising rates or 
excluding coverage for a particular condition, and places a high burden on the plaintiff to prove 
that coverage was denied because of genetic information.277 
Current state law also offers inadequate genetic discrimination protection in employment 
and health insurance.  Existing state laws differ in coverage, protections afforded, and 
enforcement schemes.  The majority of state genetic nondiscrimination laws are incomplete and 
often too narrowly worded.278  For example the problems with state genetic nondiscrimination 
laws can easily be understood by looking at the Michigan statutes.  Michigan’s genetic 
nondiscrimination statute for health insurers forbids insurers from requiring genetic testing or 
requiring disclosure of prior genetic testing, but does not prohibit an insurer from requiring an 
applicant to answer questions concerning medical history and does not include family history in 
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the definition of genetic information.279  Therefore, in Michigan the banning of genetic testing 
while allowing the use of medical and family history provides an opportunity for insurers to use 
a less reliable means of collecting genetic information.  What this means is that insurers have an 
opportunity to come to conclusions about an individual through medical or family history that 
could be potentially eliminated by a genetic test showing a person does not have a certain genetic 
trait.  There needs to be legislation that forbids health insurers and employers from inquiring into 
genetic information.  More importantly there is a need for uniformity that can only be provided 
by federal legislation.   
Uniform genetic discrimination legislation would be beneficial to individuals as well as 
insurers and employers.  Insurers and employer would be able to base standards on a uniform 
federal law, rather than a patchwork of state laws.  This is especially significant for insurers and 
employers who have operations in more than one state.  Uniform genetic discrimination 
legislation will only be helpful to individuals if it alleviates the fear of discrimination.  With 
comprehensive federal legislation addressing these concerns individuals would be able to 
participate in genetic testing without fear of being discriminated against based on the results.     
Another reason why current legislation is inadequate is that people are making major life 
decisions to avoid the risk of discrimination.  Perceived risk of discrimination is leading people 
to refuse genetic testing to safeguard employment and health insurance, and sometimes this 
occurs with significant health consequences.  If this is not policy enough for further legislation, 
fears of discrimination also results in a significant decline in research participation.  Thus, 
affecting the continued ability to undertake important genetic research.    
Additional federal legislation will be required to adequately prohibit genetic 
discrimination by employers and health insurers; to protect individuals’ genetic privacy from 
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unauthorized disclosure of genetic information; to protect people from mandatory genetic 
testing; and to regulate the use, storage, and distribution of genetic information.  Congress and 
the state legislatures have proposed and enacted legislation to prevent potential abuses of genetic 
information.  However, genetic discrimination enacted thus far leaves several legislative 
loopholes permitting genetic discrimination.  Furthermore, many existing genetic discrimination 
laws left the issues of genetic privacy and autonomy unaddressed.  Consequently, closing these 
gaps will require additional legislation. 
B.  Simple Proposal: Legislation Protecting Individuals From Genetic Discrimination 
 There are several approaches that may be taken to prevent genetic discrimination.  First, 
we may rely on current state and federal laws to provide genetic discrimination protection.  This, 
however, is a inadequate solution.  A second option is to leave the decision to the courts to 
decide.  Again, this solution is inadequate and poses serious problems.  A uniform law is 
necessary to ensure fairness and eliminate genetic discrimination.280  Specific federal legislation 
should be passed which prohibits genetic discrimination by employers and health insurers. 
The most important parts of any legislation that will protect against genetic 
discrimination are simple: 1) coverage and definitions, 2) scope, 3) strong enforcement, and 4) 
privacy and disclosure.281  First, in coverage and definitions the legislation must cover all genetic 
information, including personal medical history and family history, which predicts future health 
risks in healthy individuals.  The coverage must include blood tests, urine tests, chemical, and 
cholesterol tests.   Predictive genetic information should be protected regardless of how it is 
discovered.  Information that is discovered through a test not intended to reveal genetic 
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information should be covered.  The broad definition of genetic information would have to 
include information of family history to provide adequate protection.  The “protected” genetic 
information definition should be used rather than the “predictive.”   The “protected” definition 
provides much broader protections.  This essentially will protect information from use even if it 
is used to confirm a diagnosis or symptoms to an illness.   
Second, the scope of the legislation must prohibit both employers and health insurers (all 
health insurers, individual and group) from collecting protected genetic information and using it 
to discriminate in the health care system and in the workplace.  Employers and health insurers 
should not be able to collect, require, or request any genetic information including personal 
medical history or family medical history.   An exception should be placed in the area of 
employment law in that the use of genetic information should be permitted in certain situations 
to ensure workplace safety and health.  An example of this would be when employees are 
monitored for the effects of a particular substance, found in the workplace, to which continued 
exposure could cause genetic damage under certain circumstances.282  However, when genetic 
information about an employee is obtained, the information should be maintained in a 
confidential medical file, rather than a personnel file.283 
Third, legislation must provide individuals who experience genetic discrimination the 
right to seek redress through legal action, with access to meaningful remedies. A meaningful 
penalty or sanction to encourage employers and health insurers to comply is needed.  Individuals 
who are discriminated against should be able to choose whether to file suit with Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or bring a claim in federal or state court.  
Individuals should have the right to bring unlimited claims for compensatory and punitive 
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damages.  The reason for the harsh penalties is to act as a deterrent.  Genetic discrimination is 
very hard to prove, and without harsh penalties employers and health insurers will have no 
incentive not to  discriminate.    
Finally, legislation must ensure that those entities or people holding genetic information 
about individuals will not disclose it to third parties without the permission of the individual.   
All genetic information that is obtained should be kept as confidential medical records, not as 
personnel records.  Genetic information is the most personal form of private information, and 
should not be shared by employers and insurers.   
Currently, there is no federal legislation that provides the protection of the simple 
provisions outlined above.  Although, Senate Bill 318 and House Bill 602 would provide similar 
protection, and fill some of the loopholes left by the ADA and HIPAA, they still have some 
potential shortcomings.   One potential problem with these proposed bills is that they may 
increase employment litigation.  Critics of these bills argue that the EEOC dispute resolution 
procedures provide adequate protection, and there is no reason for these claims to clog  the court 
docket.284  However, it very unlikely that EEOC dispute resolution procedures would provide the 
same incentive not to discriminate, as would the ability to bring unlimited claims in federal and 
state courts.  The right to bring unlimited claims in federal and state courts will provide a 
meaningful incentive for employer and health insurers to avoid discriminating based on genetic 
information.  If employers and insurers are provided with this incentive, there will be less genetic 
discrimination, thus less claims will be brought in the future.       
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Both Senate Bill 382 and Senate Bill 1995 do not provide enough coverage of genetic 
information, and fail to provide meaningful remedies.  Both of these bills exclusions from what 
is considered genetic information render them inadequate in protecting against genetic 
discrimination by employers and health insurers.  Senate Bill 382 lacks an enforcement provision 
and Senate Bill 1995 only provides for enforcement by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), which could lack the authority of a court and the right to bring an 
unlimited action.  Current legislation is inadequate in protecting individuals from genetic 
discrimination.  Federal legislation needs to be passed which provides protections similar to the 
those provided by the simple provisions outlined above.   
CONCLUSION 
 While genetic information and genetic technology show great promise for improving 
human health and preventing future health problems, they can also be used in ways that are 
fundamentally unjust.  Genetic information can be used as a basis for “insidious 
discrimination.”285  This will be important to all of us  because with advances in genetic 
technology, we will soon realize that everyone has genetic predispositions for one condition or 
another. 
 Protection against discrimination based on genetic information is inadequate under the 
current scheme of state and federal law.  There is a lot of uncertainty as to protections against 
genetic discrimination, in particular the ADA and HIPAA.  What remains clear from the public 
apprehension of genetic testing is that current state and federal legislation is not offering 
adequate protections.   
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 It is time that Congress takes steps to catch up with the world of medicine and science. 
There are signs of progress in the fact that there is extensive bipartisan support for legislation 
protecting against genetic discrimination.  While the tragic events of September 11 may have 
slowed genetic discrimination legislation for a time, it appears both parties are ready to support 
some sort of legislation addressing genetic discrimination.  With the recent introduction of 
Senate Bill 1995, while not identical to Senate Bill 318 or House Bill 602, there appears to be 
enough common ground that there is room to compromise and potentially adopt part of these 
bills.  Although a quick enactment of legislation is unlikely due to the complexity of genetic 
discrimination, it is time for Congress to take the necessary steps.    Federal legislation is needed 
to adequately and uniformly address the serious problem of genetic discrimination by employers 
and health insurers.  If left unregulated fear of genetic discrimination has the potential to prevent 
individuals from participating in research studies or taking advantage of new genetic 
technologies to improve their health.  Advances in genetic technology should be used as a tool to 
address the health needs of the nation, not as tool for discrimination by employers and health 
insurers.  President Bush when outlining his health care agenda in a speech to the Medical 
College of Wisconsin February 11, 2002 remarked: “Genetic information should be an 
opportunity to prevent and treat disease, not an excuse for discrimination.  Just as we addressed 
discrimination based on race, we must now prevent discrimination based on genetic 
information.”286 
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